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ABSTRACT

As part of the research into the causes of war,
different opinions have developed over the impact public
opinion can have on the conduct of war. To explore this
question, this paper examines the role played by public
opinion in the Vietnam war through three different
paradigms of public opinion (the force, constraint, and
enabling condition models) and Daniel C. Hailin's
hypothesis that public opinion regarding the Vietnam war
was created by the president when he sent clear messages
through the media. The three models and Hailin's
hypothesis were used to explain data produced by six events
during the Vietnam war and how they were reported during
the conflict. It was discovered that the role of public
opinion depends upon the event since no one model could
explain all six events. Also, Hallin's theory was found to
be limited in that, though a high level of agreement
between public opinion and the media's reporting was
identified, the president was unable to guide the media in
all situations. The results demonstrate that the search
for the causes of war and the role of public opinion in
such events is far from complete.
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PUBLIC OPINION AND STATE POLICY

CHAPTER I
PARADIGMS OF PUBLIC OPINION
The author's first formal introduction to the study of
international relations was in the pages of Walter S.
Jones' The Logic of International Relations.1

As is

standard with such texts, Jones' work covers many of the
problems and issues faced by those who seek to understand
human behavior in this field.

One of these questions is a

riddle that has plagued social scientists since the dawn of
civilization: What are the causes of war?
In one chapter, Jones examines fourteen seperate
theories of the causes of war, each with its own merits.*
In his estimation, the most "comprehensive theory" amongst
these explains war as a tool of conflict resolution.3

In

this theory war "is a rational instrument of decision, and
war policies are decided by a logical computation of costs
and benefits."*

Though Jones does not delineate this

"rational" decision making process, a model of the "logical
computation" that takes place in the mind of the statesman
can be constructed through the works of Benjamin J. Cohen
and Geoffrey Blainey.
In his search for the causes of imperialism (which he
treats as identical to the phenomenon of war), Cohen claims

2

3

that since the current international aystem is
characterized by competitive* sovereign states* the
"rational** behavior for a state "is to

broaden its range

of options--to aaxiaize its power position."0

Without

attempting to determine the nature of power* Cohen proceeds
to explain that power is accumulated through the simple
process of gaining "influence" or "dominance" over others*
which then allows the state to control the range of options
available to its rivals.6

One way in which influence and

dominance can be attained is through the tool of war.
However* war is useful in this regard only if it
indeed increases a state's power position.

Blainey

discovered in hie analysis of all wars from 1700 to 1971
that war occurs only when a state believes it can "gain
more by fighting than by negotiating."7

In making this

determination* he claims that a statesman will consider
seven different factors which guage a state's ability "to
impose Cits! will on the rival nation;" one of these
factors is public opinion* both foreign and domestic.•
Though Blainey includes public opinion as an important
consideration* he fails to explain exactly how public
opinion can affect the conduct of war.
have tried to do so.

Others* however*

In their works* Joseph A. Schumpeter*

Thorstein Veblen* Raymond Aron* and Edmund Silberner reach
various conclusions about the role of public opinion in
armed conflicts.
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PUBLIC OPINION AND WAR:
Both Veblen and Schumpeter suggest that modern public
opinion is ill-suited to the purposes of statesmen
attempting to carry out war policies and, thus, will tend
to act as a restraining factor in such matters.

In the

words of political economist Claude Ake, Schumpeter
believes that the imperialistic (or war) “impulse** derives
its source “from the habits and instincts that moulded
peoples and classes into warriors under pressure of the
struggle for survival and supremacy.**9

However, Schumpeter

also indicates that “individualism and democratisation** as
specific “modes of thought and action associated with the
capitalist mode of production*' will cause the modern world
to turn away from such "non-rational" activitea as
warfare.10

Veblen views the influence of modern society in

a similar fashion.

He states that “subservience of the

community" to war policies can only be maintained with
great effort against the “disentegrating influenceCs) of
modern life."11

The influences that Veblen is concerned

about are to be found in industrial society,
where the machine industry constantly enforces
the futility of personal force and prerogative in
the face of wide-sweeping inanimate agncies and
mechanical process, and where the ubiquitous
haggling of the price system constantly teaches
that every man is his own keeper.10
Essentially, both Schumpeter and Veblen contend that “the
interests and ways of thought which the diffusion of the
industrial system Cwill) spread among the masses" will
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eventually change the attitudes of the public by leaaening
the “will to conquer" and the "will to power" and,
therefore, reduce the likelihood of war.1*
The exact oppoalte of thla view la held by many,
Including Aron, who dlacount the arguaenta of Veblen and
Schumpeter and view the public aa open to war aa It ever
waa.

Aron atatea:
The dealre for collective glory, the pride of
participation In national greatneaa, even aa one
of the loweat of cltlzena or aervanta, may well
aurvive In the age of cannona, akyacrapera, and
underground atatlona adorned with marble.1*

Aa evidence of thla, he auggeata that the "mlliterlam of
the maaaea" haa given the world a "cult of violence" which
can cauae "charismatic leadera of popular factions Cto be]
driven farther by the delirium of power than are the
inheritors of the feudal spirit. . . ."1S>

In this view,

public opinion can easily become a tool for the marshalling
of the resources of the state for war.
Finally, Silberner takes a more cautious approach and
concludes that "the economic and social evolution of
mankind" will produce public opinion that can take both
hawkiah and pacifiat stances.16

After examining in detail

several different schools of thought on the peaceful or
warlike tendencies of public opinion, Silberner found no
sufficiently convincing argument.

Speaking aa only a

social scientist can, Silberner atatea that an
understanding of the role of "pacific tendencies" and "the
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forces making for war depanda on each particular situation
that la being examined."17

Silberner'a anawer to the

question of how public opinion affects the conduct of war
can be abbreviated to the aimple statement: It dependa.
It would aeem, then, that there are different opiniona
about the appropriate place of public opinion in the
strategic calculations of atateamen.

To find an anawer to

thla question, a widely accepted method la to conduct an
empirical atudy in which the researcher aelecta a
particular war (about which extensive and accurate data
exiat) and then analyzea specific events in that war to
discover the part played by public opinion.

Such a method

ia employed in this paper through the careful atudy of the
Vietnam war.
two questions:

There are innumerable aspects of the relationship
between public opinion and the US government in the Vietnam
war that can be studied.

But the primary concern here ia

the impact that public opinion had on the management of the
war.

In addition, in light of the work of the authors juat

mentioned above, it la important to include an examination
of the source of public opinion in the event.

Therefore,

it ia neceaaary to find answers to the following questions:
How did public opinion affect the US government'a conduct
of the Vietnam war? and What waa the source of public
opinion regarding this event?
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The first, question seeks processes by which public
opinion influences the formulation and implementation of
policy.

From an examination of the works of several

scholars who have studied these processes, it is apparent
that at least three different paradigms have been and are
being used to describe the impact of public opinion on
government policy: the force, constraint, and enabling
condition paradigms.
PUBLIC OPINION AS FORCE:
Public opinion has often been conceived of in a manner
which suggests the action of one billiard ball striking
another.

In the force model, public opinion appears in the

political environment, collides with existing government
policy, and alters it--much as one ball hits another on the
table and, therefore, changes its direction of motion.
Examples of the use of this paradigm can be found in the
works of Alexis de Tocqueville and George F. Kennan.
In his Democracy in America Tocqueville suggests that
republics cannot well engage in large, extended projects in
the face of obstacles, particularly in matters of foreign
policy.

Tocquevilie's argument seems to rest on the belief

that the public does not have the necessary skill.

He

claims that the public simply **has little capacity for
combining measures in secret and waiting patiently for the
result.”1*

He almost seems to suggest that citizens of

republics simply lack the 'knack' for deceit.

This
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deficiency atema from the republican citizen'a lack of
proper education In the peculiarltlea of international
political
Experience, morea, and education almoat alwaya do
give a democracy that aort of practical everyday
wiadom arid underatanding of the petty buaineaa of
life which we call common aenae. Common aenae ia
enough for aociety'a current needa, and in a
nation whoae education haa been completed,
democratic liberty applied to the atate'a
internal affaira bringa bleaainga greater than
the ilia reaulting from a democratic government'a
miatakea. But that ia not alwaya true of
relationa between nation and nation.
Aa a reault of thla, a republic tenda "to obey ita feelinga
rather than ita calculationa and to abandon a long-matured
plan to aatiafy a momentary paaaion. • .
Thia ia the point at which he breaka into the force
paradigm.

Momentary paaaiona (apparently hia term for

deeply felt public opinion) appear in the midat of
complicated plana and knock them off courae.

Public

opinion aimply puahea the government about almoat according
to whim.

Clearly, then, Tocqueville perceivea public

opinion aa a force— one with which the government muat
reckon if it ia to attempt to maintain any conaiatency at
all in ita foreign affaira.
Kennan haa alao uaed the force paradigm in hia work.
One obaervation that Kennan makea about republica ia that
they will produce erratic behavior in mattera of foreign
affaira.

Specifically, he claima that aa an aaaembly (in

thia caae Congreaa) becomea involved in the foreign policy
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making proceaa, foraign policy itaelf bacomea erratic.
Thia effect ia produced by the influence of domeatic
advocatea on the deciaion making proceaa.

In hia book The

Cloud of Danger, he atatea:
Congreaa ia, unqueationably and inevitably, more
vulnerable than ia the Executive branch, and the
State Department in particular, to preaaurea from
ethnic and other organized lobbiea or minoritiea,
anxioua to influence foreign policy to the
advantage of their varioua parochial aima and
concerna. The examplea of thia are ao numeroua
that it would be auperfluoua, perhapa even
invidioua, to cite any aingie one of them.*1
Later in the book he claima:
When thia aort of thing occura, it aimply meana
that the power of our government to act upon ita
international environment ia being abuaed and
diatorted for domeatic-political purpoaea, with
the reault that our actiona on the external acene
tend to become, aa expreaaiona of national
policy, incoherent and either ineffective or
aelf-defeat ing•
Hedeacribea thia effect rather vividly
a atate

by deacribing auch

in "the foreat of international eventa Caa] a man

with aome aort of muacular affliction, obliging him to
perform purpoaeleaa and aelf-defeating movementa.
Aa doea Tocqueville, Kennan clearly deacribea public
opinion aa a force.

Varioua intereat groupa, with their

varioua opiniona on different queationa, place preaaure
upon Congreaa and puah it to adopt certain policiea.

The

government, in effect, geta knocked about like a billiard
ball after the break.
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PUBLIC OPINION AS CONSTRAINT:
Another way to conceive of public opinion ia the
constraint aodel.

Under thia paradigm, public opinion

becoaea an anchor which holda back the ahip of atate.

In

caaea auch aa thia, the public'a preferences prevent the
government from selecting specific policy
alternativea— action ia not altered but prevented.

An

example of the uae of thia model can be seen in Immanuel
Kant'a book Perpetual Peace.
The critical argument Kant makea in this book ia that
republics are more reluctant to engage in war than other
forma of government.

He auggeata that war will aimply

ceaae to be a viable option for foreign policy under
republican conatitutiona due to pressures from public
opinion.

Kant explains:
If, aa ia inevitably the caae under thia
[republican] constitution, the consent of the
citizena ia required to decide whether or not war
ia to be declared, it ia very natural that they
will have great hesitation in embarking on ao
dangerous an enterprise. For thia would mean
calling down on themselves all the miseries of
war. . . . But under a constitution where the
subject ia not a citizen, and which ia therefore
not republican, it ia the simplest thing in the
world to go to war. For the head of atate is not
a fellow citizen, but the owner of the atate, and
a war will not force him to make the slightest
sacrifice ao far aa hia banquets, hunta, pleasure
palaces and court festivals are concerned

In brief, Kant believes that republics are more
peaceful due to forces that “rely for their effectiveness
upon man's desire to pursue his self-interest and his
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desire to survive"— forces that have the effect of
reatraining the government.

Republics are leaa likely to

engage in war because the public's extremely negative
opinion of war acts as a weight pulling the option down,
making its implementation difficult if not impossible.
PUBLIC OPINION AS ENABLING CONDITION:
The third and last way of explaining how public
opinion can influence policy fits what may be referred to
aa the enabling condition paradigm.

In thia model, public

opinion neither altera nor prevents action by the
government but makes action poaaible--much as the soil
makes possible the growth of a plant.

Public opinion

provides the political environment in which government
policy can thrive.

The public does ao by merely making the

implementation of the policy possible, not by directly
supporting the policy alternative itself.

Both Niccolo

Machiavelli and Walter Lippmann make use of this last
paradigm in describing the impact of public opinion on
foreign policy.
Machiavelli'a book The Prince is an instruction manual
for the new ruler.

In it he states that rulers who are

supported (which includes a measure of respect or fear) by
their subjects will have a freer hand in foreign affairs
than those who are loved or hated by their subjects.

In

the chapter on cruelty he states:
Men are less concerned about offending someone
they have cause to love than someone they have
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cause to fear. Love endures by a bond which sen,
being scoundrels, nay break whenever it serves
their advantage to do so; but fear is supported
by the dread of pain, which is ever present.0*
On the subject of being hated, he clearly indicates
its disadvantages in the chapter on the utility of
fortresses:
Not to be hated by his subjects is the best
fortress a prince can have. If the people hate
him, a fortress will not save him, for when the
people take up arms against him they will never
lack for foreigners to succor then.07
On the other hand he clains that the prince who enjoys
the support of the people "will be able to stand alone" and
that "all near hin Cwill be] disposed to obey hin."00

In

support of this Machiavelli cites the exanple of the
Spartan king Nabis who was able to sustain "attack fron the
whole of Greece and fron a triunphant Roman arny as
well."00
It is obvious then, as it surely was to Nabis, that a
prince who is supported by the people will be better able
to carry out foreign policies without fear of losing his
crown.

Other princes will be restricted since they nust

guard against foreign aided rebellions and conspiracies.
But note that the support of the people does not include
support for any policy alternative: it nerely grants
obedience to the ruler, naking the inplenentation of policy
possible.

Therefore, the support of the people becones an

enabling condition which enpowers the prince.
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Lippmann aakaa uae of the paradiga in a alailar
fashion.

In deacribing governmental policy making, he

makea the claim that, theoretically, governments have more
flexibility in the conduct of their foreign affaira than
they may have in other apherea of policy.

Essentially,

Lippmann claima that the public ia severely underinformed
and does not readily feel the effect of foreign eventa.
This is so mainly because "Ci3n foreign affairs the
incidence of policy ia for a very long time confined to an
unseen environment."3a

He also suggests that it is the

case that, *'Ct3he [political] environment must be confined
within the range of every man's direct and certain
knowledge.,,3t

If thia is the case, then "CtJhe field of

democratic action is a circumscribed area," and beyond that
area ia a field on which public opinion haa no
preferences.30

Therefore, since foreign affairs is beyond

the range of direct and certain knowledge (which also means
beyond the experience of the public), public opinion on
foreign policy will be limited or even non existent.
Logically, then, Lippmann concludes that governments will
have the ability to move with relative ease in foreign
affaira:
Those programs are immediately most popular, like
prohibition among teetotalers, which do not at
once impinge upon private habits of the
followers. That is one great reason why
governments have such a free hand in foreign
affairs.33
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In thia case, public opinion (or the lack thereof)
allows the governsent to take actions it deems proper and
necessary in pursuit of the national interest.

Again,

support ia not offered for any particular policy; various
policy options are merely permitted by the public to exist
on the range of viable alternatives without interference.
SOURCES OF PUBLIC OPINION:
The second question listed enquires into the source of
public opinion in the Vietnam war regardless of how it
influenced particular events.

It has recently and commonly

been suggested that the president provides the public with
its opinions in foreign affairs, especially in matters of
war and peace.

In his book The “Uncensored War**: The Media

and Vietnam. Daniel C. Hallin states in reference to
President Lyndon B. Johnson's eventual reaction to the Tet
offensive in the Vietnam war: Once the president acted, the
public seemed to follow his lead, as it usually does in
foreign policy.3*
people on his own.

Johnson could not, however, "lead" the
Since the administration could not

communicate with the people directly, it had to be done
through the media (hence the term).

Once the media

reported the president's position, the public then
responded.
However, he points out later in book that,
(w)hen the administration fails to provide a
clear direction, the media (begins] to become
more active. . . . CW]ith officials divided and
communication channels within the administration
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inoperative, the media Cbecomes3 a forum for
airing political differences rather than a tool
of policy.3®
Implicit in thia statement (and explicit in hia comment on
Johnson's reaction to the Tet offensive) is the claim that
when the president was clear, public opinion was guided by
the media.

However, when the president failed to

communicate his positions clearly to the media, then the
media as a "tool of policy" broke down.
thia is what happened in the Vietnam war.

Taken as a whole,
Hallin explains

in the conclusion of his book:
The behavior of the media . . . is intimately
related to the unity and clarity of the
government itself. . . . This is not to say that
the role of the press is purely reactive. Surely
it made a difference, for instance, that many
journalists were shocked both by the brutality of
the war and by the gap between what they were
told by top officials and what they saw and heard
in the field, and were free to report all this.
But it is also clear that the administration's
problems with the "fourth branch of government"
resulted in large part from political divisions
at home, including those within the
administration itself, which had dynamics of
their own. In a aenae, what is really
remarkable, as CMcGeorgel Bundy observed, is that
the press and the public went as far with
American policy in Vietnam as they did.3®
From this logic, it can only be assumed that events
in the Vietnam war which negatively affected public opinion
had their impact because the administration did not clearly
indicate to the media which interpretation to use.
Hailin's "hypothesis" also seems to suggest that an
administration should, if it wishes to have public support
at the start of a project, prepare public opinion prior to
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the initiation of policy.

Such efforts are aade when

presidents attempt to introduce the idea of an action (i.e.
drop hints) long before anything is actually done.
RegardlessP in seeking the source of public opinion in the
Vietnam war, Hallin essentially claims that public opinion
was created by the president when he sent clear messages
through the media.
AN EMPIRICAL TEST:
Now that three different paradigms of public opinion
and Hailin'a hypothesis on the source of public opinion in
the Vietnam war has been examined, the only remaining task
ia to apply these tools to specific events in the war.
substance of six events encompassed in the war is the
subject of the second chapter.

The
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CHAPTER II
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE VIETNAM WAR
Table 1 presents an abbreviated chronology, derived
from a history by John E. Mueller, of the Vietnam war from
1954, the year in which President Dwight D. Eisenhower
offered aid to South Vietnam, to 1971, the end of which saw
a drastic scaling down of United States military efforts in
the country.

During the war, several events occurred which

affected the course of the conflict in ways which stand out
from the rest**-either because of the magnitude of their
impact or because of the unique forces involved.

This

chapter examines six of these events and their
relationships to contemporary public opinion.
Specifically, these events include Eisenhower's offer
of aid to South Vietnam on 25 October 1954; Johnson's draft
call on 28 July 1965; a set of three withdrawals ordered by
President Richard M. Nixon on 8 June, 16 September, and 15
December 1969; the February 1966 Senate hearings on US
involvement in South Vietnam; the Tet Offensive launched on
30 January 1968; and the US invasion of Cambodia in May
1970.

Certain events in this list also share more in

common than may be readily apparent.

The first three

events provide examples of the government acting under the
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TABLE 1

CHRONOLOGY OF VIETNAM WAR 1954 - 1971

7/21/54

Geneva accorda end Indochina war between French
and Communist-led guerrillas

10/25/54

President Eisenhower offers aid to South
Vietnamese government

2/12/55

United States advisers take over training of
South Vietnamese army from French

10/23/55

Diem becomes president of South Vietnam

1958

Growth of Viet Cong guerrilla war against
government of South Vietnam

11/8/60

South Vietnamese government charges North
Vietnam is infiltrating troops into South
Vietnam

11/10/60

Revolt of South Vietnamese paratroopers against
Diem fails

Fall/61

Decision by Kennedy Administration to increase
military and economic aid to South Vietnam,
raise numbers of military advisers from 685 to
several thousands

10/9/62

Diem says war against Viet Cong now going well

10/2/63

Defense Secretary McNamara predicts most of the
14,000 United States military personnel in
South Vietnam can be withdrawn by the end of
1965

11/1/63

After months of internal political and
religious turmoil, Diem ousted from office and
killed in coup

11/22/63

Kennedy assassinated; Johnson becomes president

12/21/63

McNamara abandons plan to withdraw by end of
1965, notes gains of Viet Cong after Diem coup

(TABLE 1 CONTINUED)

3/17/64

United States pledge of continued assistance to
South Vietnam as long as required to control
"Communist aggression"; warnings to North
Vietnam repeatedly issued

8/64

In response to two firings on American ships in
Gulf of Tonkin, North Vietnamese PT boat bases
are bombed; Congress passes resolution
supporting action and other such measures to
protect United States forces and "prevent
further aggression"

11/3/64

Johnson reelected president

2/7/65

North Vietnam bombed by United States planes in
retaliation for Viet Cong attack on United
States bases in South Vietnam

2/24/65

United States planes bomb Viet Cong targets in
South Vietnam for first time

2/27/65

State Department White Paper on aggression from
the North

3/8/65

Marines land in South Vietnam to defend United
States base

4/2/65

United States to increase troops in South
Vietnam, increase air strikes

4/17/65

15,000 demonstrators in Washington protest
bombings; teach-ins follow

5/65

Five-day suspension of air raids

6/21/65

Ky becomes premier of South Vietnam

7/28/65

Johnson announces increased draft calls to
allow buildup in Vietnam from current 75,000
to 125,000

12/24/65

Month-long bombing halt begins

(TABLE 1 CONTINUED)

2/66

Senate hearings on war in Vietnam

4/12/66

First B-52 raids over North Vietnam

6/29/66

Extension of bombing raids to oil dumps near
Hanoi

9/11/66

Elections in Vietnam for constituent assembly

12/66

Reports from North Vietnam by New York Times
correspondent on civilian damage caused by
United States air strikes

2/67

Wilson-Kosygin probes for negotiations on war;
North Vietnam continues to demand unconditional
bombing halt before talks can begin

4/15/67

Mass antiwar rally of 100,000 in New York

9/3/67

Elections of Thieu and Ky in South Vietnam

10/21/67

Antiwar demonstrators storm Pentagon

11/67

Bunker-Westmoreland visit to United States,
voice optimism on war

1/30/68

Beginning of major offensive by Communists
during Tet cease-fire

2/28/68

Military requests 206,000 more men

3/1/68

McCarthy gets sizeable vote in challenge
to president in New Hampshire primary

3/22/68

General Westmoreland removed as commander in
Vietnam and promoted

3/31/68

Johnson declares partial bombing halt, calls
for talks, announces he will not run for
reelection

4/3/68

North Vietnam agrees to preliminary peace talks

(TABLE 1 CONTINUED)

4/9/68

Defense Secretary Clifford announces policy of
549,500 troop ceiling and gradual transfer of
war responsibility to South Vietnam

5/68

Further Communist offensives

10/31/68

Full bombing halt agreed to, "productive
discussions" to be begun

11 /6/68

Nixon elected president

Spring/69

Communist offensives

6/8/69

Nixon announces beginning of troop withdrawals:
25,000 by August

9/16/69

Nixon announces withdrawals of 35,000 more men
as pace of war slackens

10/69

Nationwide protests against the war

11/15/69

Mass antiwar march in Washington

11/16/69

Reports of civilian massacre by United States
troops in March 1968 at Mylai

12/15/69

Nixon announces further withdrawal of 50,000

4/20/70

Nixon pledges to withdraw 150,000 troops over
the next year

5/70

Joint United States-South Vietnamese invasion
of Cambodia; massive protest in the United
States

2/71

South Vietnamese troops, with United States
support, invade Laos

Spring

Trial and conviction of Lt. Calley for mass
murder at Mylai

6/13/71

New York Times begins its controversial
publication of the "Pentagon Papers"

(TABLE 1 CONTINUED)

10/71

Reelection of Thieu

12/71

Series of bombing raids on North Vietnam

Source: John E. HueHer, War. Presidents, and Public
Opinion (New York: Wiley, 1973) 29-32.
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influence of clear and eaaily identifiable public opinion.
On the other hand, the laat three eventa provide inatancea
in which aoae factor appeara to have affected (perhapa even
to have created) public opinion itaelf.
THE GOVERNMENT ACTS:
A. Early Aid - 25 October 1954
By 1954, the Korean conflict waa over.

However,

indigenoua coaauniat forcea were active in foraer French
Indochina.

Shortly after the partition of Vietnaa by the

Geneva accords, rebel activity in South Vietnaa began to
increaae.

Since France waa in no poaition to fortify the

new South Vietnaaeae government, Eiaenhower decided the US
had no choice but to fill the void.

Aaerican aid to

anti-coaauniat forcea in South Vietnaa actually began long
before ground forcea becaae involved.

It waa no aecret

that Washington had been aiding the French for years in
their efforts to keep the colony out of coaauniat hands.
The deciaion to offer material aid the South
Vietnaaeae had the support of a significant aegaent of the
Aaerican people.

In early May 1953, of those who knew of

the Indochina conflict <71* total), 56* said the US should
aend "war aateriala to help the French there."1

However,

the public waa strongly againat the idea of sending US
ground forcea.

Of that same group who knew of the

conflict, 78* aaid the US should not "aend aoldiera to take
part in the fighting."®

Table 2 presents evidence of the

TABLE 2

ATTITUDES TOWARD SENDING GROUND TROOPS TO VIETNAM

Date

Disapprove

Approve

No Opinion

The United States is now sending war materials to help the
French fight the Communists in Indochina. Would you
approve or disapprove of sending United States soldiers to
take part in the fighting there?
d/15/53

85

8

7

5/2/54

68

22

10

5/21/54

72

20

8

Source: American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup
Poll: Public Opinion 1935 - 1971. gen. ed. William P.
Hanson and Fred L. Israel, vol. 2 (New York: Random,
1972) 1170, 1235, 1243.
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continued popular opposition to plana to aend ground forcea
to Vietnaa.

In Auguat of 1953, and in two separate

occasions in May of 1954, 85X, 68*, and 72* of respondents
stated that they would not approve of sending ground forces
to Vietnam.
The Eisenhower administration waa not ignorant of thia
fact.

In the early months of 1954, as the government

continued to send military aid to the French, Eisenhower
went to lengtha to make sure the public understood that he
did not intend to aend ground forcea to Vietnam to take
part in the ground action.

For example, in a news

conference in February, Eisenhower claimed that the US
getting involved in another war would be a mistake and that
"everything he did waa calculated to prevent this from
happening."3

He alao promised in another news conference a

month later "that he would not involve the United States in
any conflict, including Indochina, without first seeking
Congressional declaration of war."4

a

Such blanket,

preemptive policy statements are not normally made from the
White House, but Eisenhower apparently feared that public
opinion would not tolerate another large scale war so soon
after Korea.

Conaequently, US troop strength in Vietnam

during the Eiaenhower administration averaged only 650 per
year.a
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B. The Buildup - 28 July 1965
According to Table 1, the aecond major escalation of
the war in Vietnam occurred in 1965 when Johnson announced
a draft call to allow an increase in troop strength to
125,008.

The war effort was not progressing well--the

Pentagon needed more manpower to "finish" the job.

This

buildup reaffirmed US commitment to the South Vietnamese
government and the continuation of the presence of American
forces in Vietnam.
As was the case with Eisenhower's offer of aid, this
too conformed to public attitudes about the war.

The level

of support that existed for the ongoing war effort is
indicated in responses to the question "Should the United
States continue its present efforts in South Vietnam, or
should we pull our forces out?" in early and late February
of 1965 in which, respectively, 64* and 66* of the total
population favored continuing US involvement•*

In

addition, Table 3 indicates that, from January to October
1965, a solid majority believed that the war was not a
mistake.

In January 50* of those polled believed the war

was not a mistake and by October that percentage had risen
to 64*.

It was, therefore, entirely reasonable to assume

that the public would approve of an increased US presence
in the region.

In support of this. Table 3 indicates that

shortly after the announcement of the increased draft call.

TABLE 3

ATTITUDES TOWARD VIETNAM WAR AND
PRESIDENTS JOHNSON AND NIXON

Date
1/65
4/65
5/65
6/65
7/65
d/65
9/65
10/65
11/65
12/65
1/66
2/66
3/66
5/66
7/66
8/66
9/66
11/66
1/67
2/67
4/67
6/67
7/67
8/67
10/67
11/67
12/67
1/68
2/68
3/68
4/68
8/68
9/68
10/68
11/68
1/69
2/69

Mistake?
Johnson
(No)
in Vietnam
50%
52

Johnson
Approval

Nixon in
Vietnam

Nixon
Approval

71*
67
64
70
65

61
58

63

64
56
59
49

50
54
47

49
51

43
43
43

52
50

43

48

33

44
46

39

41

35
26

40
35

66
62
59
61
58
54
56
51
48
48
46
48
52
40
38
41
46
48
41
36
49
35
42

37
39
39

43
49

59
61

(TABLE 3 CONTINUED)

3/69
4/69
5/69
6/69
7/69
8/69
9/69
18/69
11/69
1/70
2/70
3/70
4/70
5/70
7/70
8/70
9/70
11/70
12/70
1/71
2/71
3/71
4/71
5/71
6/71
10/71
11/71
12/71

44
44
48

65
61
64
63
65
62

53
32
33
32
34
36

52
58
64
65

57
68
61
66
53

48

57
61
55
56
57
52

31
41

51
50
50

28
48
54
49
49

Source: Aaerican Inatitute of Public ODinion. The GalluD
Poll: Public Ooinion 1935 - 1971. aen. ed. William P.
Randoa
Hanaon and Fred L. Iarael, vola. 2 & 3 (New York: !
1972); American Inatitute of Public ODinion. The GalluD
Poll: Public ODinion 1972 - 1977. aen. ed. William P.
Hanaon and Fred L. Iarael, vola. 1 & 2 (Wilmington
Scholarly Reaourcea, 1978); Gallup Opinion Index and
Survey Reaearch Center (U of Michigan, Ann Arbor) qtd.
in John E. Mueller, War. Prealdenta. and Public Opinion
(New York: Wiley, 1973) 54-55.
9
9

(TABLE 3 CONTINUED)

Mistake? - Some people think we should not have become
involved with our military forcea in Southeast Asia, while
others think we should have. What is your opinion? or In
view of the developments aince we entered the fighting in
Vietnam, do you think the United States made a mistake
sending troopa to fight in Vietnam?
In Vietnam - Do you approve or disapprove of the way the
(Johnson Administration) (President Johnson) (President
Nixon) is handling the (Vietnam situation) (situation in
Vietnam)?
Approval - Do you approve or disapprove of the way (Lyndon
Johnson) (Richard Nixon) is handling his job as president?
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58* aaid they approved of the way in which the Johnaon
administration waa handling the aituation.
C. Withdrawal - 8 June, 16 Sept., 15 Dec. 1969
Support for the war, however, did not laat forever.
Aa the war progreaaed over the yeara, public opinion turned
againat the continuation of the war.

Table 3 ahowa that by

March of 1968 (the month Johnaon announced that he would
not run for reelection), only 26* of the population
approved of the way he waa conducting the war.

In

addition. Table 4 clearly demonatratea that by 1969, a
large aegment of the public had come to favor the
commencement of a gradual withdrawal of US forcea from
Vietnam.

In December of 1968, 46* of the sample favored

turning over responsibility for the fighting to the South
Vietnamese, and, in January and May of 1969, 57* and 59*
felt that the US ahould immediately begin a phaaed
withdrawal.

The public mood

White: The American appetite
aated in Vietnam.

waa summed up by Theodore H.
for war had long aince been

From faculty club to student union, from

bar to parlor, from Wall Street to Main Street, all wanted
out of Vietnam.7
Nixon believed in 1968 that
importance to the voters was

the iaaue ofprimary

the ending of the war.®

Nixon

recognized this aa a real political opportunity and,
therefore, incorporated into his campaign platform a call
for the rapid conclusion of the war.

The implementation of

TABLE 4

ATTITUDES TOWARD TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM VIETNAM

Date

Agree/Yes

Disagree/No

No Opinion

Some people say that the United States should continue to
aend military supplies to South Vietnam but that we should
let them take over the fighting and make all the decisions
about peace and dealings with the Vietcong. Do you agree
or disagree?
12/5/68

46

44

10

Some people think the time has come to begin to reduce
month by month the number of United States soldiers in
Vietnam. How do you feel*-do you think the time has come
to do this?
1/1/69

57

28

15

5/22/69

59

25

16

Source: American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup
Poll: Public Opinion 1935 - 1971. gen. ed. William P.
Hanson and Fred L. Israel, vol. 3 (New York: Random,
1972) 2172, 2179, 2199.
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this policy began to have its first concrete iapact when,
after winning the election, Nixon authorized three
withdrawals in aid and late 1969.

His goal was ('to phase

out American forcea slowly enough not to jeopardize the
battlefield situation but fast enough to assuage American
political opinion."9

He ordered the withdrawal of first

25,099; then 35,000; and finally 50,000 troops--thus
beginning the gradual process of turning over the main
responsibility for fighting the war to the South
Vietnamese.

In return for keeping his campaign promise and

ordering the withdrawals, Nixon waa duly rewarded.

Aa

indicated in Table 3, public opinion of Nixon's handling of
the war improved greatly.

Later, Nixon continued this

policy with additional withdrawals.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDS:
A. Senate Hearings - February 1966
In his book on the media coverage of the Vietnam war,
Hallin states:
Beginning with the live coverage of parts of the
Fulbright Committee hearings in February 1966,
dissent became a regular feature of television
coverage. . . . The Fulbright hearings pushed
the war at least partly into the Sphere of
Legitimate Controversy. • . .*-*
These hearings were a public attempt to determine the
merits of the Johnson administration's handling of the war.
Really, for the first time, "J. William Fulbright, chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and at one time
the president's key Capital Hill supporter on foreign
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policy, went public with hia opposition to U.S. policy in
Vietnam. • . ."11

In effect, the public learned, beyond

all doubt, that its government waa not of one mind on the
iaaue of what to do in Vietnam.
Such public diacuaaion of US policy had an impact.
Table 3 indicatea that the hearing occurred toward the
beginning of a substantial slide in public perceptions of
the Johnaon adminiatration, hia handling of the war, and in
overall aupport for the war.

In February of 1966, 50% of

the public approved of Johnaon'a performance in Vietnam,
61% gave Johnaon a positive overall job performance rating,
and, in March of 1966, 59% felt that US involvement in
Vietnam waa not a mistake.

However, by November of that

aame year, those percentages had fallen to 43%, 46%, and
51% respectively.
B. The Tet Offensive - 30 January 1966
The Tet offensive waa an unexpected campaign that
caught the public's eye.

During a religious aeaaon in

Vietnam, the North Vietnamese army in cooperation with the
National Liberation Front, attacked South Vietnamese and US
positions in several separate actions involving “a wide
range of powerful, simultaneous attacks against dozens of
key cities and t o w n s . T h e

offensive demonstrated that

the US was not even close to the victory the administration
and the military had been asserting would come before long.
A former military intelligence officer who served in
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Vietnam during the war told the author that, though the
offensive waa a military disaster for the North Vietnamese,
it crippled the US war effort by solidifying public opinion
against the war.

In agreement with this assessment,

Townsend Hoopes, then Under Secretary of the Air Force,
later wrote:
I am sure . . . an attempt to carry on in Vietnam
without significant change, as though the Tet
offensive had not really happened, would have
generated a wholesale domestic cataclysm, as well
as a major explosion in the Democratic party,
which neither Lyndon Johnson nor his Vietnam
policy could have survived.13
It is not entirely clear exactly how this
radicalization of public opinion occurred.

Regardless,

Table 3 indicates that the offensive did mark a sharp drop
in Johnson's approval rating and estimates of his
management of the war.

In December of 1967, 46* of the

sample approved of Johnson's job performance and 39*
approved of his management of the situation in Vietnam.
But by March of 1966, both percentages had dropped,
respectively, to 36* and 26*.

Table 3 also indicates that

the offensive marked the end of a short term leveling off
of public support for the war and the continuation of the
former decline in support.

From July to December 1967, the

percentage of those that believed the war was not a mistake
bounced between 44* and 48*.

However, seven months after

the Tet offensive, in August of 1966, only 35* of those
polled held that same position.
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C. The Invasion of Cambodia - May 1970
The invasion of Cambodia also had an unmistakable
imapct on public opinion.

The goal of the administration

in this invasion was to eliminate enemy supply depots and
strategic forward bases that had previously been
"protected" by Cambodian neutrality.

In return for being

left alone (so to apeak), the Cambodian government of
Prince Norodom Sihanouk had ignored the communist presence
on its territory bordering South Vietnam.

The US had for

years wanted to directly strike at these bases.

Nixon

also, according to Peter A. Poole,
had been anxious, since the start of 1970, to
find a way of showing Communist leaders around
the world that hia hands were not tied by
anti-war opinion in the United States and that he
was able to meet force with force when
necessary.14
In May, he finally found his chance.

It is interesting to

note, however, that this expansion of the war occurred at
the same time the US waa in the process of reducing its
presence in Vietnam.
The decision to invade Cambodia produced an impressive
response from the public:
Meetings and demonstrations protesting the
incursion took place in towns and cities across
the United States. . . . Congressmen found their
offices jammed with students, lawyers, veterans,
and other groups urging them to reverse the
President's decision by legislative action.&s
In addition. Table 3 shows that May was the last month of a
small increase in public support for the war and the
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beginning of a decline in support, of 8 percentage points
one year later.

This loveient apparently reflected the

public's growing disaffection with the war even with US
involvement at lower levels.

The decline in support,

however, was not aa drasatic as sight be expected.

As

such, it say well have been sore of a reinforcesent of past
trends than a new developsent.
THE ROLE OF MEDIA:
Finally, in an attespt to discover the source of
public opinion, it only resains to be seen how these events
were represented in the popular sedia.

It is isportant,

for this purpose, to select channels of cossunication which
were utilized by significant elesents of the general public
and opinion leaders.

With this in sind, Newsweek, New

Republic, and Tise were selected.

All articles on Aserican

participation in Vietnas in these three popular
newssagazines for a period of three sonths before or after
each event were exasined (logically, based upon whether the
events were ones in which the governsent acted in the
context of identifiable public opinion--the first three--or
whether the event had an ispact on public opinion--the last
three).

A list of these articles is presented in Table S.

Then five questions were used to classify the articles and
\

their stand on war policy at that tine.

The resulting data

on the media's reporting of the war is presented in Tables
6 through 11.

TABLE 5

PRINT MEDIA SURVEY--ARTICLES

EVENT

NEWSWEEK

NEWI REPUBLIC

TIME

Aid Offer

19 Jl: 28+
26 J1S 17-18
26 Jl: 28
Aug: IS
2 ,
2 ■
Aug: 20
Aug: 30+
2 ,
2 Aug: 43
23 Aug : 38+

26 Jl: 6-7
2 Aug: 7-8
16 Aug : 16

19 Jl: 22
19 J1S 23
26 Jl: 16
2 Aug: 16-18
2 Aug: 18+
2 Aug: 19
2 Aug: 20+
2 Aug: 23
9 Aug: 28
23 Aug : 32

Johnaon
Buildup

3 iMy: 23-25
16 My: 49-50
28 Je: 20-21
5 ,
Jl: 30-32+
5 .
Jl: 33
19 Jl: 15
19 Jl: 17-18
26 Jl: 19-21

24 Ap: 7
19 Je: 5-6

30 Ap: 30-31
7 My: 23-24
28 My: 21-22
18 Je: 19
25 Je: 25
2 Jl: 13-14
2 Jl: 14-15
23 Jl: 15-16
30 Jl: 9-10

Withdrawal
Announcement

10 Mr: 112
31 Mr: 20-22
7 Ap: 28-30
5 My: 58
2 Ja: 44

15 Mr: 1+
22 Mr: 5-7

21 Mr: 13-14

Senate
Hearinga

14 Feb : 15
14 Feb : 33
21 Feb : 23
21 Feb : 24-27
21 Feb : 28-29
28 Feb : 17-18
28 Feb : 19-20
28 Feb : 32
7 Mr: 23, 25-26
7 Mr: 25-26
14 Mr: 26-27
14 Mr: 38

26 Feb : 8
26 Feb : 19-30
5 Mr: 5-7
28 My: 12-16

18 Feb : 20
4 Mr: 26
18 Mr: 27
29 Ap: 26
20 My: 27-28

(TABLE 5 CONTINUED)

Tet
Offensive

19
11
18
18
29

Cambodian
Invasion

4 My: 21-22
11 My: 22-26+
11 My: 54
11 My: 112
18 My: 35-36
18 My: 36+
18 My: 49+
18 My: 57-58
25 My: 31-32
25 My: 29-31
25 My: 43-45
25 My: 120
1 Je: 33-34
1 Je: 78
1 Je: 106
IS Je: 29-30
6 Jl: 88
13 Jl: 16-22
13 Jl: 23-24+
17 Aug : 36

Feb : 21
Mr: 25
Mr: 39-40
Mr: 45
Ap: 20

23 Mr: 6
23 Mr: 8-9

15 Mr: 13-14

9 My: <9-10
16 My: 1+
16 My: 11-13
23 My: 5-6
23 My: 15-18
30 My: 5-6
6 Je: 5
13 Je: 5-6
11 Jl: 7-9

11 My: 10-15
18 My: 22+
18 My: 24+
25 My: 28-34
1 Je: 21-22+
8 Je: 21
6 Jl: 16-17
6 Jl: 24
13 Jl: 6-8

TABLE 6

PRINT MEDIA SURVEY--AID OFFER
(JULY-OCTOBER 1954)

Variable

♦

A

7

B

7

E

6

(Neutral)

-

14

14

1 ‘

Variable A: Does the article mention the event or the
policy option?
Variable B: Doea the article aupport the policy option?
Variable E: Doea the article approve of the preaident'a
handling of the situation?

TABLE 7

PRINT MEDIA SURVEY--JOHNSON BUILDUP
(APRIL-JULY 1965)

Variable

♦

(Neutral)

-

A

11

B

6

5

C

10

7

2

D

7

10

2

E

8

9

2

8

Variable C: Doea the article support the continuation of
the war?
Variable D: Does the article agree with the president's
rationale for the war at the current stage?

TABLE 8

PRINT MEDIA SURVEY~ WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENTS
(MARCH -JUNE 1969)

Variable

♦

A

8

B

6

(Neutral)

2
3

C
D

3

5

E

3

5

5

TABLE 9

PRINT MEDIA SURVEY--SENATE HEARINGS
(FEBRUARY-MAY 1966)

Variable

♦

(Neutral)

-

A

12

12

C

7

14

3

D

5

14

5

E

S

11

8

TABLE 10

PRINT MEDIA SURVEY— TET OFFENSIVE
<FEBRUARY-MAY 1968)

Variable

♦

A

5

(Neutral)
3

C

5

3

D

7

1

E

1

4

3

TABLE 11

PRINT MEDIA SURVEY--CAMBODIAN INVASION
(MAY-AUGUST 1970)

Variable

(Neutral)

-

A

39

B

4

24

11

C

1

21

17

D

2

37

E

3

20

16

47

Tables 6 through S demonstrate that the media, as
public opinion (as examined above), supported each of the
options that were eventually selected.

For instance, in

each of these three events (Eisenhower's aid offer,
Johnson's buildup, and Nixon's withdrawals), not a single
article opposed the eventually selected policy option and a
majority of articles (overwhelmingly except in the case of
the buildup) favored the option.

In addition, virtually

all of the articles, in all three events, approved of or
were neutral toward the president's handling of the
situation.
Tables 9 through 11 also demonstrate that the media's
reporting mirrored the downward movement in

support for the

war found in public opinion (as examined above), though

the

media seems to have taken a somewhat more neutral rather
than negative stance toward the war after the selected
events.

For example, after the Senate hearings; Tet

offensive; and Cambodian invasion; the articles were
recorded as (toward the continuation of the war) 7
positive, 14 neutral, and 3 negative; 0 positive, 5
neutral, and 3 negative; and 1 positive, 21
negative, respectively.

neutral and 17

At the very least, the tables

indicate that public opinion did reflect the media's
reporting of the war.
Tables 9 through 11, however, also indicate that
presidential interpretations of events were not always
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respected.

In ell three cases, the media (while not

directly contradicting the president) was clearly not
persuaded to accept the president's explanations.

The most

extreme case is the Cambodian invasion after which only 2
articles were recorded as supporting the president's
rationale for the war at the current stage and 37 were
found to be neutral.

It would seem, then, that

presidential leadership in the editorial pages was not
accepted by the media during the entire war.
Now that the six selected events and how they were
represented in the media have been examined in detail, it
is possible to attempt to use the three paradigms and
Hailin'a hypothesis to explain how public opinion affected
the conduct of the Vietnam war and to discover the source
of public opinion during the conflict.
accomplished in the third chapter.

This task is
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CHAPTER III
THE RESULTS
Chapter I explored the queation of the causes of war,
established the importance of the role of public opinion in
this question, and explained three paradigms which explain
how public opinion can influence the conduct of war and an
hypothesis on the source of public opinion.

Chapter II

pictured in detail six events in the Vietnam war, their
relationships to public opinion, and how they were handled
by the media.

All that remains is to see if the models and

hypothesis can explain the data.
THE GOVERNMENT ACTS:
A. Early Aid - 25 October 1954
The facts of this event can be most clearly explained
by using the constraint model.

In the constraint model,

public opinion acts as an anchor holding back the ship of
state.

In effect, public preferences prevent the

government from selecting specific policy alternatives:
actions are not changed in any way but simply made
impossible or extremely difficult.
As explained before, immediately prior to the aid
offer the public favored sending military supplies to South
Vietnam, but it unambiguously opposed the idea of sending
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ground forcea.

The Elsenhower adsinet.rat.ion knew this and

made efforts to avoid arousing thewrath

of thepublic

by

announcing that there were no plans tosend

groundforces

to take part in the fighting any tise soon.

Therefore,

only material and economic aid, and no troops, were sent.
In effect, public opinion held Eisenhower back from
selecting and implementing a policy similar to that which
had earlier been used in Korea.
B. The Buildup - 2d July 1965
While public opinion clearly constrained Eisenhower,
it served as an enabling condition for Johnson when he
issued the draft call.

In the enabling condition model,

public opinion simply makes action possible--as the soil
makes possible the growth of a plant.

Public opinion makes

the implementation of an action possible by placing it in
the range of acceptable alternatives, but it does not
directly support any particular policy.
As demonstrated in the second chapter, at the time of
the draft call and before, public support for the war
effort was relatively high.

In fact, overall public

support for American involvement was at some of the highest
levels reached during the entire conflict.

Because of this

broad based support for the war effort, a draft call to
increase force levels in South Vietnam became a viable
alternative (even though the public, of course, may not
*

have been excited about the idea).

As a result, Johnson
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was able to give the military the troops he felt it needed
to complete its assigned task.
C. Withdrawal - 8 June, 16 Sept., 15 Dec. 1969
Nixon's series of three withdrawal orders provides an
excellent example of public opinion acting as a force.

In

the force model, public opinion is pictured as acting in
the fashion of a billiard ball.

Public opinion appears in

the political environment and smashes into existing
government policy and alters it--as one ball hits another
and changes its direction of motion.
In this case, public opinion pushed the government
toward a particular policy option.

The public, by 1969,

was rather displeased with the continuation of the war and
Nixon recognized this.

By ordering the withdrawals, then,

Nixon was merely following the lead of public opinion.

He

was elected in part by promising to end the war quickly,
kept his word by immediately ordering phased withdrawals
after election, and was rewarded in the opnion polls after
doing so.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDS:
A. Senate Hearings - February 1966
The data produced by the Senate hearings is not
explained by the three models well at all.

In this event

an action occurred (the Senate hearings) and then a force
was reduced (support for the war).

As such, public

opinion's role in the event was entirely reactive; it
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neither forced, made possible, nor conatrained anything.
Rather, public opinion waa left without direction.

The

event waa characterized more by an eroaion of force than
anything elae.
B. The Tet Offensive - 30 January 1968
At firat glance, the Tet offensive alao doea not seem
to fit well into any of the aodela.

However, on cloaer

examination it does seem to fill a gap in the force model.
In the force model, public opinion altera government
policy.

But thia public opinion must have a source.

As

pointed out earlier, the Tet offensive marked a significant
decline in support for the continuation of the war effort,
for Johnson's handling of the conflict, and for Johnson's
overall job approval rating.

These facts, combined with

the domestic debate and general upheaval which Hoopes
watched occur during the months of February and March,
suggest that something happened in the event which caused
the formation of a particular opinion in the public mind,
the goal of which was to alter government policy.
If one assumes that the force of public opinion
created by this event did alter policy in the long run, the
Tet offensive can be used to enhance the explanative powers
of the force model by identifying exactly where it was that
the force originated in the first place.

It also could be

used to explain why the opinion against the war effort took
the form and direction (which waa against the "more of the
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same" policy which had characterized Johnson's handling of
the war) that it finally did.

All of which may help the

researcher discover the finer details of how the force of
public opinion altered government policy by pointing out
key areas of concern to the public.

Regardless, the Tet

offensive at least fits the force model to the degree that
it helps explain the origins of certain aspects of public
opinion.
C. The Invasion of Cambodia - Hay 1970
The facta of this event paint a similar picture to
that produced by an examination of the Tet offensive.

An

event occurred in the conflict which apparently produced a
negative reaction in public opinion toward the continuation
of the war.

In this case, however, the second chapter

points out that the ratings dropped a smaller point spread
while the physical demonstrations of dissatisfaction were
more graphic and widespread.

Nevertheless, it seems that

something in each event did produce a particular opinion in
the collective mind of the public.

If this is the case,

the invasion of Cambodia can also be used to enhance the
explanative powers of the force model (but only if one
assumes that a policy waa later altered by this public
opinion).
SUMMARY - QUESTION #1:
How did public opinion affect the US government's
conduct of the Vietnam war?
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So far this analysis indicates that the impact of
public opinion on the conduct of the Vietnam war was
varied.

No single paradigm explains all of the six events;

in fact, the data produced by separate events is best
explained by using different models.

Therefore, this

suggests that no single explanation of the impact of public
opinion on the conduct of war may be capable of explaining
every event.

As a factor in the rational calculation to

employ the power building tool of war, one is forced to
agree with Silberner and conclude that public opinion has a
varied impact depending upon the individual situation.
THE SOURCE OF PUBLIC OPINION:
The data presented in the second chapter on the six
events and the media's reporting of these events provides
some evidence to support Hailin's hypothesis.

In seeking

the source of public opinion in the Vietnam war, Hallin
essentially claims that public opinion was created by the
president when he sent clear messages through the media.
Through such a connection, the president could have
exercised a great deal of influence on public opinion.

If

this is correct, one would expect to find two properties
evident in the relationships between the six policy events,
public opinion, and the media's representation of these
events: a strong correlation between public opinion and the
media's representation of the events and a high level of
agreement between the media's and the president's public

56

interpretations of the events.

It should also be the case

that when no clear signal was sent fro* above, the media
should have taken a less supportive stance of government
actions.
In the results of the survey, it is apparent that
public opinion and the media's reporting of the six events
were in relative agreement.

For example. Table 7 shows

that Johnson's draft call in July of 1965 was supported as
a policy option in 6 articles out of 11 (the other 5 being
neutral) and Table 3 indicates that, in August and
September of that same year, 61* of those polled said the
Vietnam war was not a mistake and Johnson personally
received a 63k approval rating.

As time progressed, public

opinion and the media kept relatively in step as they both
turned progressively negative in their assessments of the
merits of the war effort.

During and after the Tet

offensive, according to Table 10, 3 out of S articles did
not favor the continuation of the conflict (the other 5
were neutral) and Table 3 shows that, one month after the
offensive, only 41k of the sample felt the war was not a
mistake.

Table 3 also points out that two months after the

offensive only 26k approved of Johnson's handling of the
Vietnam situation and 36k approved of Johnson's job
performance.

While the media appears to have been slightly

more neutral in the end, the deterioration in support for
the war is equally evident in both.
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The aurveya alao indicate that the media did indeed
tend to agree with the president's interpretation of eventa
in the earlier atagea.

However, that agreement turned more

neutral aa the war progreaaed.

For instance, Eisenhower's

aid offer waa more than acceptable to the media.

Aa

demonatrated by Table 6, apparently the media atrongly
aupported the idea aince all 7 articlea which mentioned the
policy option aupported it.

In the caae of the Cambodian

invasion, however. Table 11 indicatea that only 2 out of 39
articlea (the reat were neutral) agreed with Nixon'a
rationale for the invaaion.

Further, the table alao ahowa

that only 1 article aupported the continuation of US
involvement in Vietnam while 21 were neutral and 17 were
clearly againat.

Nixon waa definitely not able to lead the

media in thia caae.
One apecific event, the Senate hearinga, alao aeema to
provide data which Hallin'a hypotheaia can explain.

Aa

mentioned above, Hallin'a hypotheaia auggeata that when the
preaident did not (or waa unable to) aend a clear meaaage,
the media became a forum for public debate rather than a
device which the government could utilize to manage the
public'a perceptions.
after the hearinga.

Thia apparently ia what happened
Table 9 demonstrates that after the

hearinga, which by definition demonatrated to the public
that the government waa unclear aa to the wiadom of ita
current policies, the media assumed a more neutral atance
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toward the conflict and the president's justification of
the war than was found in earlier events: 5 articles agreed
with the president, 14 were neutral, and 5 others
disagreed.
SUMMARY - QUESTION #2:
What was the source of public opinion regarding the
Vietnam war?
The findings above indicate that Hallin'a hypothesis
is in part born out by the facts of the histories of the
six policy events.

The data presented fits patterns that

would be expected if Hallin is correct: a strong
correlation between public opinion and the media's
representation of the events and a high level of agreement
between the media's and the president's interpretations of
the events.

However, the media only supported the

president when expanding the conflict in the early stages
of the war, not in latter events like the Cambodian
invasion.

This suggests that, even when the president sent

a clear message, his hold on the media may not be have been
as strong as Hallin claims.

Therefore, there must be other

variables which can create public opinion which Hallin did
not include in his analysis.

This is especially true since

Hallin'a hypothesis is correct when it suggests that the
media as a "tool of policy" broke down when the president
failed to communicate his positions clearly.
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CONCLUSION:
These results demonstrate that the search for the
causes of war Is far from complete.

As yet, no one even

has an adequate explanation for the role of public opinion
in the conduct of war.

Therefore, models of the evolution

of the international system that rely on the warlike or
peaceful tendencies of public opinion as an important
factor must be cast in grave doubt.
These results alao suggest that public opinion is
malleable.

Essentially, the state can be conceived of as

an agent in an environment.

In this case, the environment

consists of public opinion <in reality only one factor in
the political environment).

The state must move "through"

public opinion as it acts, thus the environment can have an
impact on the behavior of the actor.

Public opinion can

force certain actions, make other actions more difficult,
and make still others possible.

However, the state is not

entirely at the mercy of public opinion for it can have an
influence in its creation.

The atate, through the media,

may be able to create an acceptable environment of public
opinion, but only in restricted circumstances.
In effect, then, public opinion is malleable--it can
be formed within limits to allow certain actions that
otherwise would be difficult if not impossible.

From this

perspective, public opinion is not really an ephemeral
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quantity floating out there in political apace, but an
integral part of the political event itself.
And thia may have important implications for the
future of armed conflict.

If authoritarian regimes

continue to fall and be replaced by representative
democracies (as has been the case in the late 60's and
early 90's), public opinion may become an even more
critical factor in analyses of the international system,
especially in regard to questions of war and peace.

How

well states are able'to mold their own public's opinions
and the opinions of citizens of other states could become a
truly vital component of power in the emerging political
order•
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